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Abstract
We prove a lower bound on the information leakage of any classical pro-
tocol computing the equality function in the simultaneous message passing
(SMP) model. Our bound is valid in the finite length regime and is strong
enough to demonstrate a quantum advantage in terms of information leak-
age for practical quantum protocols. We prove our bound by obtaining an
improved finite size version of the communication bound due to Babai and
Kimmel, relating randomized communication to deterministic communica-
tion in the SMP model. We then relate information leakage to randomized
communication through a series of reductions. We first provide alternative
characterizations for information leakage, allowing us to link it to average
length communication while allowing for shared randomness (pairwise, with
the referee). A Markov inequality links this with bounded length communi-
cation, and a Newman type argument allows us to go from shared to private
randomness. The only reduction in which we incur more than a logarithmic
additive factor is in the Markov inequality; in particular, our compression
method is essentially tight for the SMP model with average length commu-
nication.
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1 Introduction
The simultaneous message passing model (SMP) of communication complexity
(CC) can be understood as a simple model of a three node network with two play-
ers, Alice and Bob, and a referee, Charlie. Alice is given some input x, Bob some
input y, and each sends a message to Charlie who should be able to compute
with high probability some function f(x, y) from the messages. Alice and Bob
are not allowed to pre-share any resource, e.g. randomness or entanglement. See
Ref. [KN97] for an introduction to classical communication complexity. Here, we
are interested in f being the equality function, i.e. Charlie must determine whether
x = y or not.
It is known that quantum protocols have an exponential advantage in terms of
communication for computing equality in this model [BCWDW01]. Communi-
cation is always an upper bound on the information leakage of a protocol, so the
best theoretical quantum protocol has information leakage logarithmic in the input
size. In contrast, information leakage of any classical protocol computing equal-
ity is known to be at least quadratic in the input size [CSWY01]. Hence, a three
node quantum network enables Alice and Bob, by each sending a single message
to Charlie, to let him verify whether or not their inputs agree, while revealing ex-
ponentially less information to Charlie about these inputs than would be possible
in any classical network.
In the context of quantum communication, the task of computing equality
in the SMP model is referred to as quantum fingerprinting. Recently, Arrazola
and Lu¨tkenhaus [AL14] have proposed a practical quantum fingerprinting proto-
col which has prompted experimental efforts in this field [XAW+15, GXY+16].
However, the bounds stated above are asymptotic and do not account for any effect
due to finite size inputs that would be relevant in a practical setting. Moreover,
although finite-length lower bounds for the communication cost of classical proto-
cols are known which can be beaten by quantum protocols, similar lower bounds
on the information leakage are asymptotic in nature and the hidden constants are
too large for quantum protocols to surpass the bounds in a practical setting.
In order to show that quantum protocols can achieve a smaller information
leakage than any classical protocol for some finite length inputs, we must improve
on previously known lower bounds and account for the finite size nature of prac-
tical protocols. In this work, we start by improving on the known communica-
tion bounds and get an improvement of more than one order of magnitude. We
then leverage this communication bound to an information leakage lower bound
by using a series of reductions and by providing alternative characterizations of
information leakage in the SMP model. We show that, up to a logarithmically
small additive term, the average cost of communication exactly agrees with the
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information leakage; this is the best statement we can hope for. The main techni-
cal ingredient we use is a single message compression result due to Harsha, Jain,
McAllester, and Radhakrishnan [HJMR10]. Markov’s inequality and a Newman
type argument then allows us to link information leakage of any classical protocol
to our improved lower bound on worst-case communication. This new bound can
be used to show that, in realistic regimes, practical quantum protocols can achieve
smaller information leakage than any classical protocol achieving the same task,
hence showing the possibility of demonstrating a practical quantum advantage of
three node quantum networks over their classical analogues.
Organization In the next section, we state relevant definitions for communica-
tion complexity in the SMP model. We then define a notion of information leakage
in this model, and provide significant evidence that it is the right one to consider. In
the following section, we state our technical lemmata and combine them to prove
our main result. We then discuss the link between our results and the quantum
fingerprinting protocol of Ref. [AL14] before concluding. The proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
We have the following definitions for the different simultaneous message passing
(SMP) models of communication that we consider. In all of these, x ∈ X is Alice’s
input, y ∈ Y is Bob’s input, rA ∈ RA is Alice’s private randomness, rB ∈ RB
is Bob’s private randomness, rC ∈ RC is the referee’s private randomness, rAC ∈
RAC is the shared randomness between Alice and the referee, rBC ∈ RBC is the
shared randomness between Bob and the referee, mA ∈ MA is Alice’s message
to the referee, mB ∈ MB is Bob’s message to the referee, and f : X × Y → Z
is the function of x and y that Alice and Bob want the referee to compute. Note
that we abuse notation and overload the above notation for sets to also denote the
corresponding random variables. We denote byDXY the set of all joint probability
distributions µ on X × Y . All logarithms are taken to base 2, e denotes the base
of the natural logarithm, exp the exponential function in base e, and exp2 the
exponential function in base 2.
2.1 Private Coin
A protocol Π in the private coin SMP model is defined by functions ΠA : X ×
RA → MA, ΠB : Y × RB → MB and ΠC : MA × MB × RC → Z, and
by distributions for the random strings RA, RB , RC . We denote by Π(x, y) the
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random variable on Z corresponding to the output of the referee when Alice and
Bob’s inputs are x and y, respectively, with the underlying distribution given by
the randomness used in Π, i.e. rA, rB and rC . The communication cost of protocol
Π is defined as
CCpriv(Π) = dlog |MA|e+ dlog |MB|e. (2.1)
The error of Π for the function f on input (x, y) is defined as Pe(Π, (x, y)) =
PrΠ[Π(x, y) 6= f(x, y)]. The error of protocol Π for the function f is defined as
Pe(Π) = max(x,y) Pe(Π, (x, y)). We denote the set of all protocols computing f
with error at most ε as Tpriv(f, ε). The communication complexity for computing
f with error ε is defined as
CCpriv(f, ε) = min
Π∈Tpriv(f,ε)
CCpriv(Π). (2.2)
2.2 Shared Randomness
Similarly, a protocol in the shared randomness SMP model is defined by ΠA : X×
RA×RAC →MA, ΠB : Y×RB×RBC →MB and ΠC : MA×MB×RC×RAC×
RBC → Z, and by distributions for the random strings RA, RB , RC , RAC , RBC .
Everything else is formally defined as in the private coin SMP model, with any
priv subscript replaced by a sh subscript, and any averaging also accounting for
rAC and rBC . Note that we exclude the possibility of shared randomness between
Alice and Bob, as in this case equality can be computed trivially in the SMP model.
2.3 Average Length
Protocols in the average length SMP model are defined as those in the shared ran-
domness SMP model, but we also associate bit length functions `A : MA → N,
`B : MB → N on the message sets (these must satisfy some structural properties
that correspond to a variable length encoding’s ability to physically encode and
decode information in the corresponding amount of bits, and in particular satisfy
E(`A(MA)) ≥ H(MA), with H(MA) the Shannon entropy of random variable
MA, and similarly for Bob’s message. We do not further discuss these details since
they are mostly irrelevant to the discussion here). A technical subtlety in the av-
erage length model is that we allow for message sets with messages of potentially
unbounded length, and similarly we allow for potentially unbounded shared ran-
domness, though we restrict our attention to finite expected message length, and
correspondingly finite expected use of the shared randomness. The average com-
munication cost of protocol Π on input (x, y) is then defined as
CCav(Π, (x, y)) = EΠ(x,y)[`A(MA(x)) + `B(MB(y))], (2.3)
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the average communication cost of protocol Π as
CCav(Π) = max
(x,y)
CCav(Π, (x, y)), (2.4)
and the average communication complexity for computing f with error ε as
CCav(f, ε) = min
Π∈Tav(f,ε)
CCav(Π), (2.5)
with Tav the set of all protocols in the average length SMP model computing f
with ε error.
2.4 Link Between Complexities
We have the following chain of inequalities for the complexity of computing f
with ε error (we implicitly use the uniform length functions `A = dlog |MA|e,
`B = dlog |MB|e corresponding to equal length encodings for all messages of
Alice and Bob, respectively, to link CCsh with CCav):
CCpriv(f, ε) ≥ CCsh(f, ε) ≥ CCav(f, ε). (2.6)
In Section 4, we prove inequalities in the reverse direction.
3 Information Leakage in the SMP Model
3.1 Information Leakage and Compression
In a communication complexity setting, the notion of information leakage (or infor-
mation complexity) aims to quantify how much information the parties must reveal
about their inputs to compute a given function. It is known that for general two-
party interactive protocols, there can be an exponential gap between information
and communication complexity of some functions [GKR14, GKR15]. However,
for protocols with a bounded number of rounds, the two notions are known to be
almost equivalent, up to some dependence on the number of rounds and the allowed
increase in error [BR14, JPY12, BRWY13].
Often, this equivalence is shown by first arguing, through a compression ar-
gument, about the distributional setting for which players want to achieve good
average error for a fixed distribution on the inputs, and then using Yao’s minimax
theorem, which relates the distributional setting to the standard worst-case setting.
However, the analogue of Yao’s minimax theorem does not hold in the SMP
model, because we do not allow for shared randomness between Alice and Bob
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(otherwise, as pointed out earlier, computing equality becomes trivial). Neverthe-
less, Chabrakarti, Shi, Wirth and Yao [CSWY01] were able to show that for a large
class of functions (including the equality function), information and communica-
tion complexities are related in the worst-case setting. Jain and Klauck [JK09]
later extended this result to all functions and relations. These results are not strong
enough for our purposes: they are asymptotic in nature and the hidden constants
are too large to allow us to show the separation that we seek relative to quantum
information leakage. This is in part due to a limitation of their compression tech-
niques; to obtain improved bounds, we use an alternate compression result due
to Harsha, Jain, McAllister and Radhakrishnan [HJMR10]. Note that since Yao’s
minimax theorem does not hold for the SMP model, we must use the worst-case
input version of the result of Ref. [HJMR10]. We state it here after the following
definition. Here and throughout, I(; ) denotes the mutual information.
Definition 1 Let MX : X → DM be a noisy channel, i.e. for each input x, we
associate an output random variable Mx over the set M . For any X ∈ DX ,
denote by XM the joint variable where the conditional probability distribution
M |X = x is distributed as Mx for each x, and let CM = maxX∈DX I(X : M).
An exact simulator for the channelMX is a one-message protocol Π in the average
length model such that for any input x ∈ X of Alice, the referee’s output must be
distributed exactly as Mx; see Figure 1. Let Tav(MX) denote the set of all exact
simulators forMX . We define the communication complexity ofMX as
CCav(MX) = min
Π∈Tav(MX)
max
x∈X
CCav(Π, x).
Lemma 1 ([HJMR10]) For anyMX : X → DM , it holds that
CCav(MX) ≤ CM + g1(CM), (3.1)
with g1(x) = 2 log(x+ 1) + 10.
3.2 Definition of Information Leakage
We want our definition of information leakage in the SMP model to capture how
much information the referee has at the end of the protocol about the joint input of
Alice and Bob. In order to have a meaningful notion of information, we must first
pass through a distributional definition; there is no information, in an information-
theoretic sense, to learn about a fixed input. The prior-free information leakage of
a protocol is then defined by maximizing over all input distributions, in analogy to
average communication cost.
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Figure 1: Channel Simulation: the figure on the left hand side depicts a noisy chan-
nel with output distribution Mx on input x, and the one on the right hand side, the
simulation of such a channel. The goal of the simulation is to minimize the average
length of the message C while generating the same conditional output distribution
Mx on input x, while also being given free access to shared randomness R.
We define information leakage (and then information complexity) for protocols
in the shared randomness SMP model. However, the definition also applies for
protocols in the average length SMP model, and, by taking RAC and RBC to be
trivial registers, in the private randomness SMP model. Furthermore, since RAC
and RBC are independent of the inputs, note that Alice and Bob can generate them
using private randomness and transmit them to the referee without changing the
information cost, though by increasing the communication.
Definition 2 The information leakage of protocol Π on input distribution µ is de-
fined as
IL(Π, µ) = I(XY ;MAMBRCRACRBC), (3.2)
and the information leakage of protocol Π is defined as
IL(Π) = max
µ∈DXY
IL(Π, µ). (3.3)
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The information leakage for computing f with error ε is defined as
IL(f, ε) = min
Π∈Tsh(f,ε)
IL(Π). (3.4)
Note that MAMBRCRACRBC is the set of registers available to the referee
at the end of the protocol. However, since RACRBC do not contain information
about XY , it follows from the chain rule for mutual information that
IL(Π, µ) = I(XY ;MAMBRC |RACRBC). (3.5)
Moreover, I(XY ;RC |MAMBRACRBC) = 0 also, so we can further simplify as
IL(Π, µ) = I(XY ;MAMB|RACRBC). (3.6)
Again, note that shared randomness can be replaced by private randomness with-
out changing the information leakage by having Alice and Bob generate the shared
randomness privately and then transmitting it at no information cost. Allowing for
shared randomness however allows us to link information and average communi-
cation through compression arguments.
3.3 Alternate Characterizations of Information Leakage
Another notion of information is also natural to consider in the SMP model, and
satisfies many interesting properties. Following Chakrabarti, Shi, Wirth, and Yao [CSWY01],
we call it information complexity.
Definition 3 The information complexity of protocol Π on input distribution µ is
defined as
IC(Π, µ) = I(X;MA|RAC) + I(Y ;MB|RBC), (3.7)
and the information complexity of protocol Π is defined as
IC(Π) = max
µ∈DXY
IC(Π, µ). (3.8)
The information complexity for computing f with error ε is defined as
IC(f, ε) = min
Π∈Tsh(f,ε)
IC(Π). (3.9)
Note that for any Π, µ, f and ε, it holds that
IC(Π, µ) ≤ Eµ[CCav(Π, (x, y))], (3.10)
IC(Π) ≤ CCav(Π), (3.11)
IC(f, ε) ≤ CCav(f, ε), (3.12)
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in which we used that I(X;MA|RAC) ≤ H(MA) ≤ E(x,y)∼µ,Π(x,y)[`A(MA(x))],
and similarly for Bob’s message. The information complexity satisfies an additivity
property, is continuous in the error parameter for ε > 0, and, up to a small additive
logarithmic term, is equivalent to the average communication complexity, a result
that follows from two applications of the compression result in Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 For any f and any ε ∈ [0, 12), it holds that
CCav(f, ε) ≤ IC(f, ε) + 2g1(IC(f, ε)), (3.13)
with g1(x) = 2 log(x+ 1) + 10.
We provide a proof in Appendix A. Note that log IC(f, ε) ≤ logCCav(f, ε).
These properties of information complexity imply that it is equal to the amor-
tized communication complexity (ACC), i.e. the optimal asymptotic average length
communication complexity per copy for solving many copies of the same function
in parallel.
Theorem 1 For any f and ε ∈ (0, 12), it holds that
IC(f, ε) = ACC(f, ε). (3.14)
Information leakage and information complexity are closely related:
Lemma 3 For any Π and µ,
IL(Π, µ) ≤ IC(Π, µ) (3.15)
= IL(Π, µ) + I(MA;MB|RACRBC) (3.16)
≤ 2IL(Π, µ). (3.17)
Perhaps surprisingly, we can avoid the factor of 2 for worst-case input, an im-
portant fact for our practical application.
Lemma 4 For any Π, f and ε ∈ [0, 12),
IC(Π) = IL(Π), (3.18)
IC(f, ε) = IL(f, ε). (3.19)
Hence, the information leakage, being equal to information complexity, also
corresponds to the amortized communication complexity, providing an operational
interpretation for it. Proofs for Lemmata 3 and 4 are provided in Appendix B.
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4 Information Leakage Lower Bound
We show the following lower bound on the information leakage for computing the
equality function (EQn) on n bits in the SMP model.
Theorem 2 For any n, any ε ≥ 0, any δ1 > 0, and any δ2 > 0 satisfying ε+ δ1 +
δ2 <
1
2 , it holds that
IL(EQn, ε) ≥ δ1
(
2
√
g3(ε+ δ1 + δ2)
√
n− g3(ε+ δ1 + δ2)− g2(n, n, δ2)− 10
)
− 2g1(2n),
with g1(x) = 2 log(x+ 1) + 10, g2(x, y, z) = 2 log(
2(x+y)
z2·log e + 1) + 2, and g3(x) =
2 · (1/2− x)2 · log e.
4.1 Sketch of Proof
The high-level idea can be split into two parts as follows. On one side, we show
a parameterized lower bound on the communication complexity of EQn in the
private coin SMP model in terms of the allowed worst-case error ε. On the other
side, we show a general link between IL and CCpriv of Boolean functions through
a series of reductions. First, we can relate CCpriv and CCsh using a Newman type
argument [New91]. This only incurs a manageable additive loss. We then use a
Markov inequality argument to relate CCsh and CCav. This is the most costly
reduction. The equivalence, up to a small additive logarithmic factor, of IL and
CCav then completes the argument.
4.2 Statement of Lemmata
We obtain our main result by combining the following lemmata. Their proofs are
relegated to Appendix C.
We show a variation of Newman’s theorem, relating CCpriv and CCsh. Jain
and Klauck [JK09] noted that such a result holds for SMP models; to obtain better
bounds, we adapt the proofs from Ref. [Pit14, Bra11] to show:
Lemma 5 For any Boolean function f , any ε ≥ 0, and any δ > 0 satisfying
ε+ δ < 12 , denote nA = log |X| and nB = log |Y |. Then it holds that
CCpriv(f, ε+ δ) ≤ CCsh(f, ε) + g2(nA, nB, δ),
with g2(x, y, z) = 2 log(
2(x+y)
z2·log e + 1) + 2.
A Markov inequality argument allows us to relate CCsh and CCav.
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Lemma 6 For any Boolean function f , any ε ≥ 0, and any δ > 0 satisfying
ε+ δ < 12 ,
CCsh(f, ε+ δ) ≤ (1/δ) · CCav(f, ε) + 4.
We can link IL and CCpriv by combining the above two results and the link
between IL and CCav proven in Section 3.
Lemma 7 For any Boolean function f , any ε ≥ 0, any δ1 > 0, and any δ2 > 0
satisfying ε+ δ1 + δ2 < 12 , denote nA = log |X| and nB = log |Y |. Then it holds
that
IL(f, ε) ≥ δ1
(
CCpriv(f, ε+ δ1 + δ2)− g2(nA, nB, δ2)− 4
)− 2g1(CCpriv(f, ε)),
with g1(x) = 2 log(x+ 1) + 10, and g2(x, y, z) = 2 log(
2(x+y)
z2·log e + 1) + 2.
We have the following lower bound on CCpriv(EQn, ε), by adapting a simpli-
fication of an argument from Babai and Kimmel [BK97] due to Gavinsky, Regev
and de Wolf [GRW08].
Lemma 8 For any n ∈ N and any ε ∈ [0, 12), the following holds:
CCpriv(EQn, ε) ≥ 2
√
g3(ε)
√
n− g3(ε)− 6,
with g3(x) = 2 · (1/2− x)2 · log e.
In order to compare with the result from Babai and Kimmel, we can take ε =
0.01 and large enough input such that our bound essentially gives
CCpriv(EQn, 0.01) ≥ 1.66
√
n, (4.1)
in contrast to
CCpriv(EQn, 0.01) ≥ 0.1
√
n, (4.2)
an improvement by more than an order of magnitude.
Inserting the result of Lemma 8 into Lemma 7, and also using the trivial bound
CCpriv(EQn, ε) ≤ 2n, gives us the desired bound, that is
IL(EQn, ε) ≥ δ1
(
2
√
g3(ε+ δ1 + δ2)
√
n− g3(ε+ δ1 + δ2)− g2(n, n, δ2)− 10
)− 2g1(2n).
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5 Connection with Experimental Quantum Fingerprint-
ing
Recent theoretical and experimental advances have led to the possibility of demon-
strating quantum fingerprinting protocols that are capable of beating the classical
communication lower bound for equality in the SMP model. In this section, we
argue that these practical protocols can also surpass the lower bound on classical
information leakage that we have derived in this work.
Practical quantum fingerprinting protocols are based on coherent states of light.
For fixed input size n and error probability ε, it is possible, by introducing an
arbitrarily small additional error, to effectively make the protocol operate in an
Hilbert space of dimension equivalent to one of O(µ log n) qubits, where µ is the
total mean photon number. Thus, since the dimension of the signals gives an upper
bound on the information leakage, the quantum information leakage (QIL) of such
practical quantum fingerprinting protocols satisfies
QIL = O(µ log n). (5.1)
The precise expression for the upper bound on the information leakage of this
quantum fingerprinting protocol can be found in Ref. [AL14].
In Fig. 2, we plot the upper bound on the information leakage of quantum
fingerprinting for realistic experimental parameters and compare it to our classical
information leakage lower bound and the classical communication lower bound.
The information leakage lower bound was optimized over δ1 and δ2 under the
constraint that δ1 + δ2 + ε < 12 . Even though the information leakage lower bound
is significantly smaller than the communication lower bound, quantum protocols
can still operate in a regime where they leak less information than any classical
protocol.
6 Conclusion
We proved lower bounds on the information leakage of any classical protocol com-
puting the equality function on n bits in the SMP model. Asymptotic bounds scal-
ing as Ω(
√
n) were already known, but the hidden constants were too large for the
goal we have in mind: obtaining finite size bounds in a realistic regime accessible
to practical quantum fingerprinting protocols, in order to show an advantage for
such quantum protocols over any classical protocol. We succeeded in this endeav-
our, and the next step is thus to perform an experiment demonstrating this quan-
tum advantage in terms of information leakage. Since practical quantum protocols
12
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Figure 2: Information leakage for practical quantum fingerprinting protocols com-
pared to classical lower bounds. As experimental parameters, we have assumed a
visibility of ν = 0.98, dark count rate of 0.11Hz, transmissivity of η = 0.3 and
probability of error ε = 0.01.
within reach of current technology achieve low information transmission through
protocols using a large number of signals, such a comparison in terms of classical
information leakage instead of classical communication cost should allow for an
actual experimental demonstration of a quantum advantage.
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A Proofs of Compression Lemma
We restate Lemma 2 here for convenience.
Lemma 9 For any f and any ε ∈ [0, 12), it holds that
CCav(f, ε) ≤ IC(f, ε) + 2g1(IC(f, ε)), (A.1)
with g1(x) = 2 log(x+ 1) + 10.
Proof. We show that for any protocol Π in the shared randomness SMP model,
there exists a simulation protocol Π′ in the average length SMP model that exactly
simulates Π, in the sense that the referee can compute M˜A from M ′AR
′
AC and M˜B
from M ′BR
′
BC such that for any x, y, M˜AM˜BRC |X = x, Y = y is distributed
exactly as MAMBRACRBCRC |X = x, Y = y, hence he can then compute a
protocol output Π′(x, y) distributed exactly as Π(x, y). Moreover, CCav(Π′) ≤
IC(Π) + 2g1(IC(Π)), and the result follows.
We define the protocol Π′ in the following way, viewing RACMA as a noisy
channel M′A with input x ∈ X and output set RAC × MA, and similarly for
RBCMB with input y ∈ Y .
ThenR′A is empty andR
′
AC consists of random strings required for the simula-
tor of Lemma 1, for the channelM′A. Alice sends as her messageM ′A the message
required by this simulator, and the referee generates a virtual register M˜A from
R′ACM
′
A such that for any x, the virtual register on M˜A in Π
′ is distributed exactly
as the registers on RACMA in Π. Then, for any x (and for any y),
EΠ′(x,y)[`A(M ′A(x))] = CCav(M′A)
≤ CM′A + g1(CM′A).
Note that CM′A = maxX∈DX I(X;RACMA) = maxX∈DX I(X;MA|RAC).
We similarly define everything on Bob’s side and get CM′A +CM′B = IC(Π).
Also defineR′C = RC and Π
′
C = ΠC , so that indeed for any input (x, y), M˜AM˜BRC |(X =
x, Y = y) is distributed as MAMBRACRBCRC |(X = x, Y = y), hence Π′(x, y)
is distributed as Π(x, y), and
CCav(Π
′) = max
(x,y)
EΠ′(x,y)[`A(M ′A(x)) + `B(M ′B(y))]
= CCav(M′A) + CCav(M′B)
≤ IC(Π) + 2g1(IC(Π)),
and the result follows.
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B Proofs of Lemmata relating IL and IC
We restate Lemma 3 and 4 here for convenience.
B.1 Distributional inputs
Lemma 10 For any Π and µ,
IL(Π, µ) ≤ IC(Π, µ) (B.1)
= IL(Π, µ) + I(MA;MB|RACRBC) (B.2)
≤ 2IL(Π, µ). (B.3)
Proof. We first show that IC(Π, µ) = IL(Π, µ) + I(MA;MB|RACRBC) by the
following chain of inequality:
IL(Π, µ) =I(XY ;MAMB|RACRBC)
=I(XY ;MA|RACRBC) + I(XY ;MB|MARACRBC)
=I(X;MA|RACRBC) + I(Y ;MA|XRACRBC)
+ I(Y ;MB|MARACRBC) + I(X;MB|YMARACRBC)
=I(X;MA|RAC) + I(YMA;MB|RACRBC)− I(MA;MB|RACRBC)
=I(X;MA|RAC) + I(Y ;MB|RACRBC)
+ I(MA;MB|Y RACRBC)− I(MA;MB|RACRBC)
=I(X;MA|RAC) + I(Y ;MB|RBC)− I(MA;MB|RACRBC)
=IC(Π, µ)− I(MA;MB|RACRBC).
Along with the chain rule, we made use of the fact that RBC is independent of
XMARAC and RAC of YMBRBC , as well as the fact that the following are short
Markov chains: Y ↔ XRACRBC ↔ MA, X ↔ YMARACRBC ↔ MB , and
MA ↔ Y RACRBC ↔MB .
The remaining inequalities follow by non-negativity of mutual information and
by the following chain of inequality:
I(MA;MB|RACRBC) = I(YMA;MB|RACRBC)− I(Y ;MB|MARACRBC)
≤ I(Y ;MB|RACRBC) + I(MA;MB|Y RACRBC)
= I(Y ;MB|RACRBC)
≤ I(XY ;MAMB|RACRBC)
= IL(Π, µ).
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B.2 Worst-case inputs
Lemma 11 For any Π, f and ε ∈ [0, 12),
IC(Π) = IL(Π), (B.4)
IC(f, ε) = IL(f, ε). (B.5)
Proof. On one side, maxµ∈DXY IL(Π, µ) ≤ maxµ∈DXY IC(Π, µ) follows by
Lemma 3. On the other side, by restricting the maximization over DXY only to
product distributions µX ⊗ µY , we get
IL(Π) = max
µ∈DXY
IL(Π, µ)
≥ max
µX⊗µY
IL(Π, µ)
= max
µX⊗µY
I(XY ;MAMB|RACRBC)
= max
µX⊗µY
(I(X;MA|RAC) + I(Y ;MB|RBC))
= max
µX
I(X;MA|RAC) + max
µY
I(Y ;MB|RBC)
= max
µ∈DXY
I(X;MA|RAC) + max
µ∈DXY
I(Y ;MB|RBC)
≥ max
µ∈DXY
(I(X;MA|RAC) + I(Y ;MB|RBC))
= IC(Π),
in which we use the fact that XMARAC and YMBRBC are independent if X and
Y are. The results follow.
C Proofs of Lemmata relating IC and CCpriv
For convenience, we restate the lemmata before their proofs.
C.1 Link between CCpriv and CCsh (Lemma 5)
Lemma 12 For any Boolean function f , any ε ≥ 0, and any δ > 0 satisfying
ε+ δ < 12 , denote nA = log |X| and nB = log |Y |. Then it holds that
CCpriv(f, ε+ δ) ≤ CCsh(f, ε) + g2(nA, nB, δ),
with g2(x, y, z) = 2 log(
2(x+y)
z2·log e + 1) + 2.
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Proof. We use Hoeffding’s inequality: Let x1, · · · , xt be i.i.d random variables in
[0, 1], and denote the empirical mean 1t
∑t
i=1 xi = x¯. Then
Pr[x¯− E[x¯] ≥ δ] ≤ exp (−2δ2t)
= exp2(−2δ2t · log e).
Given δ > 0 and δ1 > 0, we take t = d nA+nB2δ2·log ee+ δ1.
Given a protocol Π in the shared randomness SMP model, fix inputs (x, y) and
random strings rABC = (rA, rB, rC , rAC , rBC) used for one run of the protocol,
and let Π(x, y, rABC) be the output of the protocol when run on input x, y and
random strings rABC . Let E(x, y, rABC) = 1 if Π(x, y, rABC) 6= f(x, y), and 0
otherwise. For all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , it holds that PrrABC [E(x, y, rABC) = 1] ≤ ε,
since Π makes error at most ε. We now start by partially derandomizing the pro-
tocol on Alice’s side. Fix t random strings r1AC , · · · rtAC ∈ RAC , and denote by
E(x, y, riAC) the average of E(x, y, rABC) over rA, rB, rC , rBC obtained while
fixing rAC = riAC . Then also EriAC∼RAC [E(x, y, r
i
AC)] ≤ ε for any i. Denot-
ing E¯(x, y, riAC) =
1
t
∑t
i=1E(x, y, r
i
AC), we get by Hoeffding’s inequality that
Prr1AC ,···rtAC [E¯(x, y, r
i
AC) − ε ≥ δ] ≤ exp (−2δ2t). With the above choice for t,
we get that for any pair (x, y) of input, Prr1AC ,···rtAC [E¯(x, y, r
i
AC) ≥ (ε + δ)] <
exp2(−(nA+nB)). By the union bound, there exists a choice of the riAC such that
E¯(x, y, riAC) < (ε + δ) for all x and y. Let Π˜ be the protocol in which Alice and
the referee agree beforehand on the set {riAC}ti=1 and they pick i ∈ [t] uniformly
at random before running Π with rAC = riAC . Then Π˜ has worst-case error at most
ε+δ. Starting with protocol Π˜, we can do similarly on Bob’s side, and partially de-
randomize rBC by finding a set {rjBC}tj=1 of size t such that the error of a protocol
Π˜′ in which Bob and the referee pick j ∈ [t] uniformly at random before running
the protocol Π˜, with rAC also partially derandomized, has error at most ε + 2δ.
In order to obtain a private coin protocol Π′, we instead have Alice and Bob pick
locally i and j uniformly at random before transmitting it to the referee as a prefix
to their message, so that the referee is also aware of the choice of riAC and r
i
BC ,
and they can then run Π˜′. It then holds that
CCpriv(Π
′) ≤ CCsh(Π) + 2dlog te
≤ CCsh(Π) + 2 log( nA + nB
2δ2 · log e + 1 + δ1) + 2.
We get the desired result by taking δ1 to zero and by considering δ′ = 2δ.
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C.2 Link between CCsh and CCav (Lemma 6)
Lemma 13 For any Boolean function f , any ε ≥ 0, and any δ > 0 satisfying
ε+ δ < 12 ,
CCsh(f, ε+ δ) ≤ (1/δ) · CCav(f, ε) + 4.
Proof. We make use of Markov’s inequality, stating, for a non-negative random
variable X and a > 0, that
Pr[X ≥ a] ≤ E(X)
a
.
Given protocol Π in the average length SMP model computing f with error
ε and satisfying CCav(Π) = CCav(f, ε), we will construct protocol Π′ in the
shared randomness SMP model with CCsh(Π′) ≤ 1δCCav(Π) + 2 and simulating
Π exactly on short enough messages, and aborting on too long messages.
Let cA(x, y) = EΠ(x,y)[`A(MA(x))], cB(x, y) = EΠ(x,y)[`B(MB(y))] and
c = max(x,y)(cA(x, y) + cB(x, y)) = CCav(Π). Fix δ > 0, then, for any x, y,
Markov’s inequality implies that Pr[`A(MA(x)) ≥ cAδ ] ≤ δ and Pr[`B(MB(y)) ≥
cB
δ ] ≤ δ. Define Π′ on Alice’s side as running Π and sending the message mA if it
is of length at most cAδ , and sending an abort flag otherwise, so that the referee can
output a random answer in such a case. Define Π′ similarly on Bob’s side, depend-
ing whethermB is of length at most cBδ . It holds that CCsh(Π
′) ≤ 1δCCav(Π)+4.
By the union bound, the probability that at least one of Alice or Bob sends an error
flag is at most 2δ, and then the referee’s random output is wrong with probability
1/2 on any (x, y), so that the probability of error of Π′ for computing f is at most
ε+ δ, completing the proof.
C.3 Link between IL and CCpriv (Lemma 7)
Lemma 14 For any Boolean function f , any ε ≥ 0, any δ1 > 0, and any δ2 > 0
satisfying ε+ δ1 + δ2 < 12 , denote nA = log |X| and nB = log |Y |. Then it holds
that
IL(f, ε) ≥ δ1
(
CCpriv(f, ε+ δ1 + δ2)− g2(nA, nB, δ2)− 4
)− 2g1(CCpriv(f, ε)),
with g1(x) = 2 log(x+ 1) + 10, and g2(x, y, z) = 2 log(
2(x+y)
z2·log e + 1) + 2.
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Proof. The lemma follows by combining Lemmata 2, 4, 5 and 6 through the fol-
lowing chain of inequality:
IL(f, ε) =IC(f, ε)
≥CCav(f, ε)− 2g1(CCpriv(f, ε))
≥δ1
(
CCsh(f, ε+ δ1)− 4
)− 2g1(CCpriv(f, ε))
≥δ1
(
CCpriv(f, ε+ δ1 + δ2)− g2(nA, nB, δ2)− 4
)− 2g1(CCpriv(f, ε)).
C.4 Lower bound on CCpriv(EQn, ε) (Lemma 8)
Lemma 15 For any n ∈ N and any ε ∈ [0, 12), the following holds:
CCpriv(EQn, ε) ≥ 2
√
g3(ε)
√
n− g3(ε)− 6,
with g3(x) = 2 · (1/2− x)2 · log e.
Proof. We use Hoeffding’s inequality: Let x1, · · · , xt be i.i.d random variables in
[0, 1], and denote the empirical mean 1t
∑t
i=1 xi = x¯. Then
Pr[x¯− E[x¯] ≥ δ] ≤ exp2(−2δ2t · lg e).
Fix δ > 0, and let cA = log |MA|, cB = log |MB|. We take t = d cB+22δ2·log ee ≤
cB+2
2δ2·log e + 1.
Given a protocol Π in the private coin SMP model, we derandomize the proto-
col on Alice’s side, i.e. we define a protocol Π′ also in the private coin SMP model,
but in which Alice is deterministic.
Given inputs (x, y) and random strings rA, rB , and rC used for one run of
protocol Π, let mA(x, rA) be the message sent by Alice on input x and random
string rA, and similarly let mB(y, rB) denote the message on Bob’s side. Given
messages mA and mB , let Π(mA,mB, rC) be the output of the referee when run
on messages mA and mB and random string rC , and denote
Q(mA,mB) = PrrC [Π(mA,mB, rC) = 1]. (C.1)
Now, fix x, mB and t random strings r1A, · · · , rtA and letmiA(x) = mA(x, riA).
Denote
P (x,mB) = ErA [Q(mA(x, rA),mB)] (C.2)
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and
Q¯(miA(x),mB) =
1
t
t∑
i=1
Q(miA(x),mB). (C.3)
We get by Hoeffding’s inequality that
Pr[Q¯(miA(x),mB)− P (x,mB) ≥ δ] ≤ exp2(−2δ2t · log e), (C.4)
in which the probability is over i.i.d. riA ∼ RA being used to generate eachmiA(x).
With the above choice for t, we get that for any input x and message mB ,
Pr[Q¯(miA(x),mB)− P (x,mB) ≥ δ] < exp2(−cB − 1). (C.5)
We similarly get, using a symmetrical argument, that
Pr[P (x,mB)− Q¯(miA(x),mB) ≥ δ] < exp2(−cB − 1), (C.6)
and by the union bound we get that
Pr[|Q¯(miA(x),mB)− P (x,mB)| ≥ δ] < exp2(−cB). (C.7)
For any fixed x, this holds for any message mB of Bob, and we get by the union
bound that there exists a choice of the riA(x), and corresponding m
i
A(x), such that
for all mB ∈MB ,
|Q¯(miA(x),mB)− P (x,mB)| < δ. (C.8)
Consider now the following protocol Π′ in which Alice is deterministic. Given
x, Alice finds t random strings {riA(x)}ti=1 and corresponding messages miA(x) =
mA(x, r
i
A(x)) such that (C.8) holds for all possible messages mB of Bob. She
sends as her deterministic message m′A(x) the concatenation m
1
A(x) · · ·mtA(x) of
these messages, which is of length dtcAe. Given input y and random string r′B =
rB , distributed according to RB , Bob sends message m′B(y, r
′
B) = mB(y, rB), as
in protocol Π. Upon receiving these messages, the referee computes Q¯(miA(x),mB(y, rB)),
and outputs 1 with probability Q¯(miA(x),mB(y, rB)) and 0 otherwise. Denote
Π′(x, y) the random variable corresponding to the output of protocol Π′ on inputs
(x, y), and similarly for protocol Π. Then
Pr[Π′(x, y) = 1] = ErB [Q¯(m
i
A(x),mB(y, rB))]
≤ ErB [P (x,mB(y, rB))] + δ
= Pr[Π(x, y) = 1] + δ,
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so that if x 6= y, then Π′ makes errors at most ε + δ. A similar argument shows
that Π′ makes error at most ε+ δ also when x = y, and hence on all inputs.
Now, fix ε and δ such that ε + δ < 1/2. Since Alice’s message in Π′ is
deterministic, either exp2(tcA) ≥ 2n, or there exist x 6= x′ such that Alice sends
the same message on both x and x′. But then, for any y,
Pr[Π′(x, y) = 1] = ErB [Q¯(m
i
A(x),mB(y, rB))]
= ErB∼RB [Q¯(m
i
A(x
′),mB(y, rB))]
= Pr[Π′(x′, y) = 1].
Considering y = x, it must hold that Pr[Π′(x, x) = 1] > 1/2 and Pr[Π′(x′, x) =
1] < 1/2, a contradiction. Hence, it must hold that tcA ≥ n. To get the desired
bound, fix δ1 > 0, take δ = 1/2 − ε − δ1, and let δ1 tend to zero. Optimizing
cA and cB (e.g., using calculus methods on continuous relaxations of cA and cB ,
each within an additive factor of 2) in order to minimize the total communication
cA + cB , we obtain cA ≥
√
g3(ε)n − 2 and cB ≥
√
g3(ε)n − g3(ε) − 4, so that
CCpriv(EQn, ε) ≥ 2
√
g3(ε)n− g3(ε)− 6.
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